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Morrissey: Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty

LOCHNER, LAWRENCE, AND LIBERTY
Joseph F. Morrissey∗
“It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many of
the laws of this [regulatory] character, while passed under what
is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting
the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed [for] other
motives.”1

INTRODUCTION
Many of the states of the United States have statutes, constitutional
provisions, and court decisions that deny individuals the right to have
a family, specifically a spouse and children, based on sexual
orientation. Advocates have made a wide variety of arguments
attacking such restrictions.2 Scholars and litigants frequently argue
that such acts violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection or
invade a constitutional right to privacy.3 However, such arguments
are often defeated by counter arguments presented with religious,
moral, and even emotional fervor.
This article presents and defends a new analytical framework
based on liberty of contract to advance gay4 rights. While the
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., Princeton University,
1989; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1993. For their thoughtful feedback and support, thanks
are due to many colleagues and friends, including Dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Professor David Mayer
(both of whose work, in part, inspired this piece and both of whom were thoughtful enough to give me
feedback on this work), Deans Darby Dickerson and Jamie Fox of Stetson University College of Law
for their support, and my friends and colleagues Professors Mike Allen, Brannon Denning, Christopher
Leslie, and Robert Wintemute for their support and comments on earlier drafts. In addition, thanks are
due to the organizers of the Fourth Annual Critical Race Studies Symposium at UCLA for inviting me to
present this article at their symposium in March 2010.
1. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
2. See infra Part I.A–C.
3. One trial court has even reasoned that one such piece of legislation is an impermissible bill of
attainder and that it violates the separation of powers doctrine. See In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL
5070056, at *22–25 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008) (finding a legislative ban on gay adoption violative of
the separation of powers doctrine).
4. The term “gay” is used throughout this article expansively to include all people who are in, are
pursuing, or are inclined toward same gender intimate relationships, thus including gay men, lesbian
women, and people who might otherwise be referred to as bisexual. The term is used expansively
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framework is applied here contextually to the area of gay rights, the
framework should also be applicable to a panoply of regulations that
affect private orderings—from regulations directly affecting
economic relations to those affecting marijuana, gambling, or
prostitution, just to name a few examples.5
This alternative analytical framework is more neutral and less
emotional than either the pleas for equal protection or privacy that
advocates of gay rights advance or the religious fervor with which
some opponents respond to those pleas. The framework is based on
the neutral economic principles embodied in historic notions of
liberty of contract.
Those principles were prevalent during what has become known as
the Lochner era, an era named for the infamous case of Lochner v.
New York, quoted at the beginning of this article. The Lochner case
and the era named for it were dominated by a simple presumption
that people should be allowed the liberty to order their own affairs
through contract and that regulatory encroachments on that liberty
interest should be evaluated critically. This article will argue that it is
with just such a presumption that restrictions denying individuals the
liberty to pursue and have a family should be evaluated and, most
likely, found to be unconstitutional.
The framework presented and defended here acknowledges that the
Lochnerian analysis of legislation is overly simplistic. Therefore, a
modified version of that analysis is advanced. Under this modified
Lochnerian analysis, based on the presumption that people should be
allowed the liberty to order their own affairs, three questions must be
asked when evaluating whether a court should uphold a regulation.
The first question is whether a liberty of contract interest is
implicated. If not, this framework will not apply. In most situations
involving economic arrangements, it is clear that private contractual
orderings are involved. Lochner itself addressed regulations on
because of the difficulty of exactly categorizing people as specifically or only homosexual in their
inclination. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV.
353 (2000) (discussing the paradox of gay nomenclature and the difficulties presented by attempts to
categorize people as definitely or only of one sexual orientation).
5. Application of the framework to other contexts, however, will be left for subsequent articles.
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employment arrangements. In that context, there are contracts
between employer and employee. Moreover, even in situations that
are not clearly or primarily economic in nature, if there is a private
ordering, the answer to this foundational question will typically be
yes. In the areas of marriage, adoption, and surrogacy (probed in
more depth in this article), contracts dictate each arrangement, even if
the government is involved. Thus, liberty of contract is implicated
even in those social orderings.
The second question then is whether the regulation in question
goes too far in trumping the liberty of contract interest of the parties
involved. This involves a balancing test. Is the interest advanced by
the government sufficient to outweigh the liberty of contract interest
implicated? With the presumption running in favor of the liberty
interest, the government must have strong reasons why the liberty
interest can be burdened. This analysis will not foreclose the ability
of the government to regulate in areas that impinge on the liberty of
contract but will simply ensure that the burden on that liberty interest
is warranted by a legitimate and compelling government interest. As
this article will explore, morality alone should not be a sufficient
reason.6 Typical areas deemed to be within the police powers of the
state, namely the health and welfare of individuals, could provide
sufficient reasons to legitimately regulate even if a liberty of contract
interest is burdened.
The final question that the framework presented here asks is
whether the regulation is designed to counter a significant structural
or procedural defect in the contracts subject to the regulation in
question. If so, the presumption in favor of the liberty of contract
interest should shift in favor of the regulation. In these cases, the
regulation is more likely than not to be warranted and appropriate,
allowing the parties involved to better achieve outcomes that would
be achieved if the defects to contracting in that context did not exist.
6. The Supreme Court made this principle clear in Lawrence v. Texas when Justice Kennedy cited
to Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick: “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice . . . .” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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Further, where there are structural or procedural defects in the
contracts that are the subject of regulation, the very notion of a liberty
interest in protecting those contracts is illusory and indeed
oxymoronic. There is no genuine liberty interest involved in entering
into a contract when the structure or procedure involved with that
contract is flawed, one where either party is subject to duress, for
example, or where one of the parties is likely to be fraudulently
induced into the bargain. Thus, in areas where there seems to be a
risk of inherent unfairness in bargaining, ex ante regulations that
impinge on the liberty of contract should be acceptable.
As this article further develops below, the Lochner case itself
provides a good example of this type of situation. If a court were to
determine that the employees of bakeries in 1905 had little or no
bargaining ability with their employers, then government intervention
to set fair employment conditions between those parties—conditions
that might be achieved if the bargaining process was fair—likely
would be warranted and appropriate. In such a case under this new
framework, the presumption should be in favor of the regulation.
The context explored in this article for this new paradigm is the
area of gay rights to family. Thus, this article will begin in Part I by
presenting a survey of the primary encroachments on the liberty of
gay people to enter into formal arrangements to create a family.7
Part II of this article will discuss the Lochner decision and develop
its potential for renewed application. Part II will also discuss the
philosophy and history that led up to that decision and certain other
decisions from that era. Finally, Part II will present critical analyses
of the downfall of Lochner and its analytical framework. The goal of
this part is to explain the meaning of the Lochnerian liberty of
contract interest.
Part III will explain that many of the traditional criticisms of
Lochner are unfounded and are currently being re-considered by
scholars. Part III will admit to certain shortcomings of the traditional
7. The ability of all people to create informal families is acknowledged and respected, and this
article in no way intends to diminish the significance and power of those relationships. In addition, Part I
will survey the primary challenges that have been made to those restrictions and the successes and
failures of those arguments.
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Lochner framework but will set forth more fully the modification to
that framework outlined briefly above, making the framework more
balanced and appropriate for use by modern courts. Part III will then
apply that approach to gay rights to family, hypothesizing the results
in each of the three main areas under inquiry here: rights to marry,
adopt, and enter into surrogacy arrangements.
Finally, this article will conclude in part with a summary of what
has been considered. It will then make some final remarks about the
potential usefulness of a modified Lochnerian approach to liberty of
contract, and thus to liberty itself.
I. THE SYSTEMATIC DENIAL OF GAY RIGHTS TO FAMILY
As much of the case law involving rights to family indicates, the
Supreme Court has on many occasions expressed the view that the
Constitution does protect individuals’ basic liberty interest in having
a family, including raising children. Stretching back to the landmark
case of Meyer v. Nebraska,8 interestingly a case decided during the
Lochner era, the basic notion of the liberty interest in having a family
was spelled out clearly.9 In Meyer, the Court considered and ruled as
unconstitutional a state statute that mandated that English be the only
language taught in school.10 The Court did not need to express its
view with respect to the wide array of liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, but it took the occasion to do so, stating that
[w]ithout doubt . . . [the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
liberty interest] denotes . . . the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
9. See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (describing marriage as “the most
important relation in life” and “the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would
be neither civilization nor progress”).
10. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
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recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.11

Notwithstanding the strong Supreme Court support for the notion
that the United States Constitution protects the rights of people
generally to marry and have children, gay people in the United States
have been and are still systematically denied those basic rights.12
A. The Right to Marry
Many U.S. Supreme Court cases over the years have specifically
found constitutional support for the liberty to marry. More recent
than Meyer cited above, but still decades old, is the landmark case,
Loving v. Virginia.13 While Meyer was decided during the Lochner
era, Loving was decided in the wake of Lochner and at a time when
Lochner had been widely discredited. Still, Loving was as clear as
Meyer in its support of the liberty of people to marry when, in 1967,
it struck down Virginia’s legislation that made interracial marriage
illegal.14 Regardless of the rhetoric discrediting Lochner and its
support of liberty of contract, Loving stands as testimony to the fact
that the liberty to marry was still guarded dearly in the post-Lochner
period.
In Loving, it is disturbing but instructive to note that the trial judge
was convinced, as a moral and religious matter, that marriage should
not exist between people from different races. In his opinion he wrote
unabashedly,
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 399.
See infra Part I.A–C.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 2.
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such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix.15

The ease with which the trial court was able to invoke religion and
morality as a basis for its decision is shocking. However, many
modern arguments opposing gay rights to family are similarly
premised, though perhaps slightly more disguised.16 In overturning
the trial court’s conclusion, the Supreme Court denounced the trial
court’s reasoning and again reiterated its support for the general
liberty interest of people of all kinds to marry: “The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”17
Ultimately, the Loving Court declared that the prohibition on
interracial marriage violated both the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution for
reasons that “reflect the central meaning of those constitutional
commands.”18 The prohibition violated the Equal Protection Clause
by impermissibly denying individuals the right to marry the person
they chose based solely on their racial classifications.19 The Court
found “patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination” to justify the legislation.20 The
prohibition violated the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause on
similar but slightly broader grounds—it generally denied individuals
the basic liberty to marry.21 As the Court put it, “Marriage is one of
the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival.”22
15. Id. at 3.
16. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a Woman, 83
N.D. L. REV. 1365, 1376–77, 1378 (2007) (arguing the legalization of same-sex marriage alters the
meaning of heterosexual marriage through “the transformative power of inclusion,” and “constitutes a
very real and dangerous attack upon the institution of conjugal marriage”).
17. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id. at 12.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) and citing Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888)).
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Still other, more recent cases reflect this same strong support for
the rights of people to marry. In 1978, the Supreme Court decided
Zablocki v. Redhail,23 striking down a Wisconsin statute requiring
individuals who have child support obligations to get court
permission to marry. The Court found the statute to be an
unconstitutional limitation on the liberty to marry, “reaffirming the
fundamental character of the right to marry.”24 Still, the Court did
state that reasonable restrictions on marriage may be imposed
provided that those restrictions do not significantly interfere with the
right to marry.25
In contrast to these cases that illustrate the importance of the right
to marry in constitutional law jurisprudence, it is well known today
that many states have enacted legislation and even constitutional
amendments restricting marriage to a union between one man and
one woman.26 Thus, no gay couple can enter into a marriage contract
in those states, despite the strong Supreme Court support for the
fundamental liberty interest in choosing whether and whom to
marry.27 Twenty-nine states currently have constitutional provisions
that restrict marriage to one man and one woman.28 Eleven states
have statutes that do the same thing.29
23. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 378 (1978).
24. Id. at 386.
25. Id.
26. Most recently, Florida and California have enacted such amendments. On November 4, 2008,
citizens of Florida passed Proposition 2, which amended the Florida constitution to include the
following language: “Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as
husband and wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof
shall be valid or recognized.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27. On the same day, the citizens of California passed
Proposition 8 pursuant to which a new section (7.5) was added to Article I of the California constitution,
stating: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 7.5, invalidated by Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Interestingly, on May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court ruled that the ballot initiative was
constitutional but that the 18,000 homosexual marriages that pre-dated the constitutional amendment
would remain valid. See John Schwartz, Ruling Upholds California’s Ban on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1. In a much watched federal court challenge, California’s Proposition 8 was
ruled unconstitutional as violative of both equal protection and due process rights. Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
27. For the status of gay marriage in the states, see infra Appendix A: State Marriage and
Relationship Laws.
28. Alabama (2006), Alaska (1998), Arizona (2008), Arkansas (2004), California (2008), Colorado
(2006), Florida (2008), Georgia (2004), Kansas (2005), Idaho (2006), Kentucky (2004), Louisiana
(2004), Michigan (2004), Mississippi (2004), Missouri (2004), Montana (2004), Nebraska (2000),
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On the federal level, in 1996, Congress passed the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) pursuant to which no state need recognize a
marriage from another state other than one that is between one man
and one woman.30 DOMA also defines marriage on the federal level
as a union between one man and one woman.31
By contrast, there are now five states and the District of Columbia
that have legalized same-sex marriages.32 That number would have
been six but for the fact that a statute making same-sex marriage legal
in Maine was repealed through a referendum on November 3, 2009.33
The statute had been passed just six months earlier. Further, another
five states have some form of same-sex relationship recognition, in
the form of either domestic partnerships or civil unions.34
1. Cases Supporting the Marriage Ban
One of the earliest cases to present a constitutional claim of a right
to gay marriage was Baker v. Nelson in 1971.35 In that case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that Loving stood for
limited government intrusions into the right to marry but reasoned
that the gay marriage ban was completely different from the
interracial marriage ban and did not merit constitutional protection.36
Nevada (2002), North Dakota (2004), Ohio (2004), Oklahoma (2004), Oregon (2004), South Carolina
(2006), South Dakota (2006), Tennessee (2006), Texas (2005), Utah (2004), Virginia (2006), and
Wisconsin (2006). Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, http://www.hrc.org
/documents/marriage_prohibitions_2009.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights
Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions].
29. Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
30. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
31. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
32. Connecticut (2008), District of Columbia (2010), Iowa (2009), Massachusetts (2004), New
Hampshire (2010), and Vermont (2009). Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and Other
Relationship
Recognition
Laws,
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Relationship_Recognition
_Laws_Map.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality].
33. See Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke May Bring Change in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2009, at A25 (describing the results as especially surprising in “Maine, with its libertarian leanings”).
34. California (domestic partnerships), District of Columbia (domestic partnerships), Nevada
(domestic partnerships), New Jersey (civil unions), Oregon (domestic partnerships), and Washington
(domestic partnerships). Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32.
35. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
36. The court in Baker described the distinction between interracial and same-sex marriage as both
“commonsense” and “constitutional.” Id. at 187.
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The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, claiming that there
was no federal question presented and that the issue was one solely of
state law.37
There has been a string of subsequent cases regarding gay
marriage, some citing Baker, that have found, similarly, that there is
no constitutional right for same-sex marriages.38 Those cases
routinely provide only rational basis review of the marriage ban, the
lowest level of judicial scrutiny for legislative regulations.39 In accord
with rational basis review, legislatures need only have some rational
basis for passing the regulation.40 The basis need not even be proved
to be accurate or, for that matter, even be the ultimate reason why the
regulation was passed. There simply needs to be some rational basis
for the regulation. Courts upholding a ban on gay marriage have
typically reasoned that protecting traditional marriage and family is a
sufficiently rational basis for the ban.41

37. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
38. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (finding no fundamental
right to marry a person of the same-sex); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. 2006) (finding
marriage to be a fundamental right, but not same-sex marriage because it is not “deeply rooted”);
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 976–79 (Wash. 2006) (finding that same-sex marriage is not
included in the fundamental right to marry because it is not in the state’s history and tradition).
39. See, e.g., Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1307–08 (specifically deciding that both DOMA and the
Florida gay marriage ban warranted only rational basis review, despite the litigants appeal that Lawrence
dictated a higher level of scrutiny).
40. Id. at 1308 (explaining that when rational basis review is being used, the plaintiff has the burden
of negating every possible basis upon which the legislation might have been passed); Andersen, 138
P.3d at 980. In Andersen, the plaintiffs claimed that the driving animus behind Washington’s DOMA
was anti-gay sentiment:
[Plaintiffs] say that the act’s prime sponsor distributed an article on the House floor
saying that gays and lesbians are not normal, House Floor Debate at 23 (Wash. Mar. 18,
1997) (CP at 467), and told the legislature’s only openly gay member that homosexuals
should be put on a boat and shipped out of the country, House Floor Debate at 40 (Wash.
Feb. 4, 1998), and that another legislator said that when individuals engage in
homosexual activity they confirm a “disordered sexual inclination” that is “essentially
self-indulgent,” House Floor Debate at 44 (Wash. Feb. 4, 1998) (CP at 471). They also
point to antigay sentiments expressed during legislative committee meetings.
Id. at 980. Despite these motivations, the Andersen Court went on to reason that there had to be some
legitimate reasons for passing the act, those reasons being related to the stability of a traditional family.
Id. at 985.
41. See, e.g., id. at 983 (“Under the highly deferential rational basis inquiry, encouraging procreation
between opposite-sex individuals within the framework of marriage is a legitimate government interest
furthered by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).
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The federal DOMA was challenged in a California state court in
the case of Smelt v. United States.42 The U.S. Department of Justice
filed a motion to dismiss the challenge in that case on June 11,
2009.43 In the memorandum supporting that motion, the United States
used traditional reasoning, arguing vehemently that DOMA does not
violate any provisions of the U.S. Constitution because the ban on
gay marriage meets rational basis review.44 Smelt v. United States
was ultimately dismissed on a technicality.
Recently, DOMA was challenged in two cases in Massachusetts.
In one of those cases the Commonwealth of Massachusetts itself has
filed a suit against the federal government.45 In that case, the federal
district court ruled that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.46 The Tenth Amendment reserves powers to the
states that are not specifically granted to the federal government. In
its decision, the district court reasoned that marriage is a matter of
state law, and therefore the federal government overstepped its
powers in attempting to define marriage in DOMA.47
In the other case challenging DOMA in Massachusetts, a gay
advocacy group, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, sued to
get federal marriage benefits for seven gay couples and three
survivors of same-sex spouses who had been married in
Massachusetts.48 In its opinion on that case, the federal district court
42. Smelt v. United States, No. 09-00286 (D. Cent. Cal. S. filed Mar. 9, 2009).
43. United States’ Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of
Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss, Smelt v. United States, No. 09-00286 (D. Cent. Cal. June
11, 2009).
44. Memorandum for the Defendant, Smelt, supra note 43, at 32–37. The case was dismissed on
August 24, 2009, on technical grounds. Liz Seaton, Despite Court Rejection, A Measure of Progress on
DOMA, ACS BLOG, (Aug. 25, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.americanconstitutionsociety.org/
taxonomy/term/735.
45. Complaint, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 09CV11156, 2009 WL
1995808 (D. Mass. July 8, 2009); Martin Finucane, Mass. Challenges Federal Defense of Marriage Act,
BOSTON
GLOBE,
July
8,
2009,
available
at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/
breaking_news/2009/07/mass_to_challen.html?s_campaign=8315.
46. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass.
2010).
47. Id.; Abby Goodnough & John Schwartz, Judge Topples U.S. Rejection of Gay Unions, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A3.
48. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010), available at
www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/2010-07-08-gill-district-court-decision.pdf.

Published by Reading Room, 2011

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4

620

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:3

ruled that DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying
gay, married people the rights afforded to married people generally.49
While these two rulings represent a tremendous advance in the fight
to recognize a right for gay people to marry, they are sure to be
appealed.
2. Cases Against the Marriage Ban
Some recent state court cases have been ardent in their positions
that bans on gay marriage violate their state constitutions. Among
those recent cases are cases from the highest courts of Massachusetts
and California. In Goodrich v. Massachusetts Department of Public
Health, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that any
prohibition on gay marriage violated their state constitution’s equal
protection and due process clauses.50 The Massachusetts court
declined to find that the restrictions warranted heightened strict
scrutiny review51 (as discrimination based on race, for example,
would). Still, even applying the lower rational basis review, the court
found the justifications for the ban against gay marriage to have no
rational basis at all. As the court explained, “The Massachusetts
Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It
forbids the creation of second-class citizens.”52 The court further
stated, “That exclusion is incompatible with the constitutional
principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality under
law.”53 The restrictions were thus struck down.54 As a result, gay
marriage is now legal in Massachusetts.
In California, a more complicated landscape has emerged. In the
summer of 2008, the Supreme Court of California overturned an
appellate court decision to uphold a statutory ban on gay marriage in

49. Id. at 397.
50. Goodrich v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).
51. Id. (“[W]e conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the rational basis test for either due
process or equal protection. Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not
consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.”).
52. Id. at 948.
53. Id. at 949.
54. Id. at 961.
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California.55 The appellate court had reasoned that (1) the legislature
had a reasonable interest in promoting the traditional definition of
marriage, and (2) the legislature had spoken by passing the ban,
which represented the widely held views of Californians that gay
marriage should be banned.56 The California Supreme Court rejected
these arguments and instead applied the heightened strict scrutiny test
to the discrimination against gay people represented by the marriage
ban.57 Under strict scrutiny, the marriage ban must have been
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.58 The California
Supreme Court could not find the ban on gay marriage necessary or
at all related to a compelling state interest and struck it down.59
Nonetheless, Californians were presented with a constitutional
amendment in November of 2008 to include the ban on gay marriage
in their state constitution.60 The measure passed, restoring the ban on
gay marriage that the California Supreme Court had rejected.61 A
subsequent state court challenge to the constitutional amendment was
unsuccessful.62 However, the constitutional amendment was
challenged in federal court in the case of Perry v. Schwarzenegger.63
The Perry court reversed the law in California again, ruling that
Proposition 8 violated both the equal protection and due process
provisions of the Constitution.64
Even though the California Supreme Court was unsuccessful in
removing the ban against gay marriage in its state, two other states
have very recently followed the California Supreme Court’s lead and
used a heightened degree of scrutiny to find their state’s ban on gay
55. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
56. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 718–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
57. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 446.
58. Id. at 452.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the language and effect of the
constitutional amendment).
61. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2008, at A1–3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/marriage.html?_r
=1&scp=6&sq=%22gay+marriage%22+and+california&st=nyt.
62. Schwartz, supra note 26.
63. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see Eva Conant, The
Conscience of a Conservative, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2010, at 46–54.
64. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp at 1004.
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marriage unconstitutional. In 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court
found, among other things, that discrimination against gay people
warrants the intermediate standard of constitutional review and that a
ban on gay marriage cannot meet that standard.65 Then, in early 2009,
the Iowa Supreme Court did the same.66
B. The Right to Have Children
There are also a variety of statutes and cases that are specifically
aimed at the right of gay people to have children. The regulations on
having children fall into two general categories that correspond with
avenues for individuals or couples to have children when they are
unable to have them naturally: adoption and surrogacy.
1. Adoption
Most of the states in the United States have adoption statutes that
are dictated by proceeding in the “best interests” of the child.67 In
Arkansas, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, and Utah, however, the
best interests of the child have largely been ignored, or subordinated,
if the intended parents are gay.68
Florida has witnessed a very recent turn around in what was a
decided anti-gay adoption environment. In 1977, the Florida
legislature adopted a statute that made it patently illegal for a gay
person to enter into an adoption contract notwithstanding any other
qualifications that person might have as an adoptive parent or the best
65. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476–82 (Conn. 2008) (“Although we
acknowledge that many legislators and many of their constituents hold strong personal convictions with
respect to preserving the traditional concept of marriage as a heterosexual institution, such beliefs, no
matter how deeply held, do not constitute the exceedingly persuasive justification required to sustain a
statute that discriminates on the basis of a quasi-suspect classification.”).
66. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (“We are firmly convinced the exclusion of
gay and lesbian people from the institution of civil marriage does not substantially further any important
governmental objective. The legislature has excluded a historically disfavored class of persons from a
supremely important civil institution without a constitutionally sufficient justification. There is no
material fact, genuinely in dispute, that can affect this determination.”).
67. Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and
Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 885 (2000).
68. For an outline of the adoption restrictions in the states, see infra Appendix B: State Adoption
Laws.
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interests of the child involved.69 The statute reads simply, “No person
eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a
homosexual.”70
That statute was motivated by a surprisingly clear and expressed
intention to keep gay people in the closet. One of the senators who
led the passage of the legislation back in 1977 stated, “We’re trying
to send a message telling them, ‘We’re really tired of you. We wish
you’d go back in the closet.’”71
In the federal circuit court case addressing the Florida ban on gay
adoption, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children &
Family Services, the federal court accepted the promotion of
traditional families as a legitimate state interest that was advanced by
the ban.72 In what could be viewed as a tacit approval of the
discriminatory intent of the statute, the court then went as far as to
say that the specified rationale need not have actually been the intent
of the statute as long as the rationale provides a plausible purpose.73
In a more recent Florida state court case coming out of Monroe
County (home to the free-thinkers of Key West), the ban on gay
adoption was challenged again.74 In that case, the trial court accepted
69. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2003), invalidated by In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008). The invalidation of this Florida statute was later reaffirmed by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals of Florida on September 22, 2010. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption
of X.X.G., 2010 WL 3655782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010).
70. Id.
71. Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville, Fla.), June 1, 1977, at B2.
Senator Peterson’s remarks were even more extensive and outrageous. He explained in this article that
“[t]he problem in Florida has been that homosexuals are surfacing to such an extent that they’re
beginning to aggravate the ordinary folks who have a few rights of their own . . . . They are trying to
flaunt it.” Id. When asked about the potential difficulty in identifying who is a homosexual when trying
to enforce the legislation, Senator Peterson responded, “I have no problem knowing what a homosexual
is . . . and the judge or whoever makes the decision on adoption . . . will [also just] know.” Transcript of
Senate Floor Debate on SB 354, May 11, 1977 (Sen. Peterson), at 21–22, cited in In re Adoption of Doe,
2008 WL 5070056, at *10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008). At the same time the adoption ban for gay
people was being considered, Senator Peterson was also attempting to pass legislation to ensure that
clothing stores had separate changing rooms for men and women, claiming “[w]e’re trying to stop men
from trying on women’s clothes . . . it is becoming a real problem in Tallahassee, Lakeland and Miami.”
Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers, supra note 71, at B2, cited in In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056,
at *11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008).
72. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819.
73. Id. at 818 (noting that the burden is on the one attacking the legislation to negate all conceivable
bases for it, whether or not the basis can be found in the record).
74. See In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008).
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three theories upon which it found the ban on gay adoption to be
inconsistent with the Florida Constitution.75 First, the court found the
ban to be a special law pertaining to adoption that is prohibited by the
Florida Constitution.76 A special law in Florida is one that
impermissibly classifies people or groups in a way that does not
relate to the primary purpose of the statute.77 The court found that
treating gay people uniquely and forbidding them from adopting
made the statute an impermissible special statute.78 Second, the court
found the ban to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder, as it acts
punitively against the people who are forbidden to adopt.79 Third, the
court reasoned that the legislation usurped the power of the court in
determining the best interest of the child in a violation of the
separation of powers that had been spelled out in the Florida
Constitution.80 These novel arguments allowed the circuit court to
find, differently from Lofton and earlier Florida state court cases,81
that the ban on gay adoption was impermissible.
Yet another recent Florida circuit court case challenged Florida’s
ban on gay adoption head-on. In that case, coming out of MiamiDade County, the court ruled that there was absolutely no rational
basis for the discrimination against gay people in the Florida adoption
statute.82 Further, the court stated, citing Lawrence v. Texas,83 that
morality alone was not a sufficient basis for the ban:84 “[P]ublic
morality per se, disconnected from any separate legitimate interest, is
not a legitimate government interest to justify unequal treatment.”85
On September 22, 2010, the Third District Court of Appeals in

75. Id. at *21–23.
76. Id. at *21.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *22.
79. Id. at *22, *26.
80. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056, at *27–32 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008). The court
referred to Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Id.
81. See, e.g., Cox v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 656 So. 2d 902, 903, 905 (Fla.
1995).
82. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *25–29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
83. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
84. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *29.
85. Id. (emphasis added).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/4

16

Morrissey: Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty

2011]

LOCHNER, LAWRENCE, AND LIBERTY

625

Florida upheld the lower court decision ruling that the adoption ban
had no rational basis.86
Mississippi currently still targets gay people, prohibiting adoption
by gay couples.87 Unlike under the Florida statute, however, it seems
that single gay people in Mississippi are not specifically prohibited
from adopting.88
Michigan and Utah each forbid unmarried couples from adopting
though single people are allowed to do so. Michigan’s law simply
makes adoption by unmarried couples illegal.89 Utah also prohibits an
individual from adopting if that person is cohabitating with a partner
of either the same or opposite sex and is not married.90
On November 4, 2008, Arkansas voters approved a ballot measure
to create a law providing that an individual “cohabitating with a
sexual partner outside of a [valid] marriage” may not adopt or serve
as a foster parent.91 This meant gay couples could not jointly petition
to adopt, and second-parent adoption was also not available to them.
Single gay people could adopt.92 In April 2010, however, a circuit
court judge in Pulaski County, Arkansas struck down this adoption
law, finding that it violated the Arkansas Constitution.93
In Michigan and Utah (and, until very recently, in Arkansas), a gay
person living together with a same-sex partner would be prohibited
from adopting. However, each of those states does allow unmarried
single people to adopt. Arguably then, a single gay person in those
states could adopt, but one who is in a committed relationship (with
more resources and more help for child care) cannot.94 Utah’s statute
86. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008). This case was upheld by
the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida on September 22, 2010. See Fla. Dep’t of Children &
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 2010 WL 3655782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010).
87. Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2004).
88. “Any person may be adopted . . . by an unmarried adult or by a married person whose spouse
joins in the petition.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(4) (2004).
89. Single people and married couples may adopt. Unmarried couples may not jointly petition for
adoption. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.24 (2005).
90. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (2008).
91. Initiated Act 1, 2009 Ark. Acts 14, 14-16 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-301 to -306 (Repl.
2009)).
92. See id.
93. Cole v. Arkansas Dep’t Human Servs., No. 60CV-08-14284 (Ark. 6th Cir. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010).
94. Id. § 78B-6-117(2)(b).
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goes further and creates a presumption that it is in the best interests of
the child to be placed with a married couple and only under
exceptional enumerated circumstances would that rule be broken.95
Restrictions such as these on the freedom of individuals to
structure their own personal life arrangements through contracts and
thereby to pursue their own vision of a happy and fulfilled life are
justified as regulations that are meant to promote public welfare.96
Scholars and litigants alike have attacked such restrictions as
unconstitutional for violating both the Equal Protection and Due
Process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in part
because gay people are generally not part of a group that has
traditionally been afforded heightened protection under the
Constitution, the challenges have been met with mixed success.97
2. Surrogacy
Surrogacy arrangements are, for many people, the only way to
have genetically related children. Surrogacy arrangements have been
controversial throughout the United States for many years but are
now legally permitted in about half of the states.98 States that uphold
surrogacy agreements do so because surrogacy allows people who
otherwise could not have their own biological children to have and
enjoy that basic human experience. Still, in certain states where
surrogacy agreements are permitted and upheld, gay people are
95. Id. § 78B-6-117(4).
96. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819–20 (11th Cir.
2004). In that case, Florida’s ban on gay adoption was challenged. “Florida argues that the statute is
rationally related to Florida’s interest in furthering the best interests of adopted children by placing them
in families with married mothers and fathers.” Id. at 818. The court concludes:
Florida also asserts that the statute is rationally related to its interest in promoting public
morality both in the context of child rearing and in the context of determining which
types of households should be accorded legal recognition as families. Appellants respond
that public morality cannot serve as a legitimate state interest. Because of our conclusion
that Florida’s interest in promoting married-couple adoption provides a rational basis, it
is unnecessary for us to resolve the question.
Id. at 819, n.17.
97. A few state decisions have been exceptions to this rule. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). These are discussed supra Part I.A.1.
98. See infra Appendix C: State Surrogacy Laws Categorized.
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carved out and categorically forbidden from pursuing this avenue to
having children.99
In a surrogacy arrangement, a woman carries a baby for another
intended parent or parents and relinquishes any claim to custody
when the child is born. There are two basic forms of surrogacy:
traditional and gestational.100 In a traditional surrogacy arrangement,
the surrogate’s egg is used and is fertilized by the sperm provided by
the intended parent or parents.101 The traditional surrogate then
carries the baby and, though genetically related to her, relinquishes
custody pursuant to the surrogacy agreement to the intended parent or
parents. Alternatively, in a gestational surrogacy, the egg used to
create the embryo is not the surrogate’s but is provided, as is the
sperm, by the intended parent or parents. Thus, in a gestational
surrogacy agreement, the surrogate is not biologically related to the
child born but is the gestational carrier.
The availability of surrogacy as an option is much more vital for
gay men than for gay women. Many gay women are able to use a
sperm donor and then carry their own biological child—a process that
is not so easy for gay men. Thus, it is often two gay men who are a
couple, unable to have a baby by themselves, who enlist the help of
an egg donor and a surrogate. One of the men uses his sperm to
fertilize the egg, and the resulting embryo is placed into the
surrogate. If successful, the surrogate delivers the child, and the gay
men take custody and become parents, with one of the men being the
biological father of the child.
One of the difficulties of surrogacy arrangements is what to do if
the surrogate refuses to relinquish custody after the birth of the baby.
Upholding surrogacy agreements (pursuant to which the surrogate
99. See infra Part I.B.2.a (describing states that have a marriage requirement as a pre-requisite for a
binding surrogacy contract).
100. See generally Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for
Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995) (explaining the state statutory schemes for
surrogacy).
101. The terms “traditional” and “gestational” surrogacy are used commonly. See, e.g., Richard F.
Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to
Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602, 604 (2002) (advocating for the elimination of a marriage
restriction on parenthood).
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had agreed to relinquish custody) has, to some states, seemed like
upholding a contract whereby the surrogate sells her baby to the
intended parents for the fees paid under the contract. This form of
“baby selling” has seemed inappropriate and against public policy in
many states.102
The most celebrated case in this area is the case of In re Baby M
decided in 1988.103 That case involved a traditional surrogacy
arrangement. After the surrogate decided to violate her surrogacy
agreement and keep custody of the child, the case went to court to
consider whether the surrogacy agreement was enforceable.104 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, in this landmark case, refused to uphold
the agreement for the very reason specified above, that the
arrangement seemed like paying for a child and was against the
public policy of the state of New Jersey.105 The case has become the
touchstone for debates about the ethics of surrogacy and whether
such arrangements should be permitted or whether they essentially
create a market for babies and commodify women in a way that is
repugnant to modern society and the public policy of the states.106
More than twenty years have passed since the Baby M case and
now eighteen states in the United States clearly permit and regulate
surrogacy, with only eight states clearly making it illegal. In the
remaining states, the law regarding surrogacy arrangements is
unclear.107 Advances in technology that make artificial insemination
safer, more reliable, and more commonplace combined with the
growing use and demand for surrogacy have pushed states to

102. See infra Appendix C: State Surrogacy Laws Categorized.
103. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
104. Id. at 1237.
105. Id. at 1240.
106. For a thoughtful examination of that case, see Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in BabyMaking: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007). In a very recent case involving
gestational surrogacy, New Jersey affirmed that surrogacy agreements in that state are against public
policy and will not be upheld. A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23,
2009); Jacob M. Appel, Doubling Down in Baby M: New Jersey’s Ongoing Resistance to Surrogacy,
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 3, 2010, http://huffingtonpost.com/jacob-m-appel/doubling-down-in-baby-Mn_b_409992.html.
107. See infra Appendix C: Surrogacy Laws by State.
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recognize that there is a need and a place for surrogacy in society.108
The trend toward allowing surrogacy, albeit with safeguards and
restrictions, seems to indicate that more states will likely move in this
direction as well.
a. States with a Marriage Requirement
Notwithstanding the widespread availability of surrogacy in the
United States, some of the states which expressly permit surrogacy,
including Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah,
and Virginia, have closed off this avenue to unmarried people. Those
states have all passed legislation to make surrogacy contracts binding
only if the intended parents are married.109 Thus, in states where gay
marriage is prohibited (all but one of the states just listed), gay people
will be unable to avail themselves of surrogacy as an option.
The marriage requirement for surrogacy contracts was actually
challenged in 2000 in Florida in Lowe v. Broward County.110 The
Florida courts were clear. The appellate court declared that gay
couples in a committed domestic partnership simply are not entitled
to the same benefits reserved exclusively for married couples under
Florida state law, including the right to enter into a valid and binding
surrogacy agreement.111 Despite the clear discrimination recognized
by the court in this case, the law was vigorously defended and
upheld.112
The status of the surrogacy law in New Hampshire will be
interesting to observe since gay marriage became possible beginning
in January 2010.113 Thus, the marriage requirement for surrogacy
contracts in New Hampshire will presumably no longer restrict gay
108. This is indicated by the wide number of states that now permit surrogacy agreements to be
entered into and enforced. See infra Appendix C: Surrogacy Laws by State.
109. In addition, there are many other requirements for surrogacy agreements in states that permit
them. In Florida, for example, the intended mother must be either infertile or at high risk for injuring her
own or the baby’s life. FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2010). In Utah, the intended parents must be married, but
there are also additional requirements including that the surrogacy must proceed from assisted
reproduction and not sexual intercourse. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801(3), (5) (2010).
110. Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
111. Id. at 1205.
112. Id.
113. See Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32.
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couples from entering into those contracts. Still, as with the other
states that insist on marriage as a requirement to enter into a
surrogacy statute, any single people, gay or otherwise, will be
foreclosed from this option. Note that these particular statutes
discriminate not only against gay people but also against all
unmarried people generally.114 The arguments advanced in this article
should apply equally to defend against that discrimination as well.115
The result of the surrogacy legislation in these states that require
the intended parents to be married is slightly complicated. It is not
that gay people (or single people) cannot enter into surrogacy
contracts and proceed to attempt to have biological children through
that route. It is simply that, if there is a dispute under the contract
(about the ultimate custody of the child or anything else), the courts
of those states will not uphold or enforce the surrogacy contract.
Thus, a single gay person or couple entering into a surrogacy
arrangement would be risking the surrogate keeping custody of the
resulting child, despite having agreed not to do so.
This was exactly the situation presented in the Baby M case. In that
case, the surrogate decided to breach her agreement to give custody
of the child to the intended parents. The court was then faced with a
custody battle between the biological mother who acted as the
surrogate, and the biological father who had commissioned the
surrogate’s services. The court ultimately did award custody to the
biological father (the intended parent under the contract) and not the
surrogate but did so in accordance with typical custody
considerations—the best interests of the child—and not with
deference to the surrogacy agreement.116 Had the surrogate in the
Baby M case been awarded custody, she also would have had legal
114. For an extensive discussion of the detrimental impact of marriage requirements in adoption and
surrogacy arrangements, see Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A
Constitutional Problem? The Married Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1991); Richard Storrow, Rescuing Children from the
Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted
Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006).
115. See Storrow, supra note 114, at 314–31; Jamie L. Zuckerman, Comment, Extreme Makeover—
Surrogacy Edition: Reassessing the Marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and the
Right to Revoke Consent in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. REV. 661, 676–78 (2008).
116. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1555–61 (N.J. 1988).
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rights to claim child support from the biological father despite having
intentionally breached her agreement with him.117
b. States Without a Marriage Requirement
There are now eleven states that clearly allow surrogacy regardless
of whether the intended parent or parents are gay or single.118 Illinois
passed a progressive surrogacy act in 2005 that is very strong in its
protection of the liberty of all individuals to enter into surrogacy
contracts but at the same time very protective of all of the parties
involved.119 Accordingly, any person can enter into a contract with a
surrogate as an intended parent and have the contract upheld,
provided that the arrangement complies with the statute’s
requirements.120 The safeguards dictated by the statute include
requirements that protect the health and mental well-being of the
surrogate.121 Thus, the surrogate must be of a certain age,122 have
received psychological and legal counseling,123 and cannot be forced
through a specific performance remedy to be impregnated if she
decides to breach her contractual promise to proceed as a
surrogate.124 These safeguards benefit not only the surrogate but also
the intended parents who can be more certain that the surrogate is
appropriate for that role and is therefore more likely to fulfill her role
in accordance with the agreement.
As the foregoing discussion has shown, strident restrictions still
abound preventing gay people from marrying and having children,
just as their heterosexual counterparts can and have throughout
history. With the few exceptions outlined above (California, Iowa,
and Connecticut state courts), courts addressing constitutional

117. Id. at 1227.
118. See infra Appendix C: Surrogacy Laws by State.
119. See generally Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 (2009) (outlining the
statutory scheme for surrogacy agreements in Illinois).
120. See id. at 47/25.
121. Id. at 47/20, 47/50.
122. Id. at 47/20(a)(1).
123. Id. at 47/20(a)(4), (5).
124. Id. at 47/50(b).
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challenges to these restrictions have used the lowest level of
constitutional scrutiny to find that the bans are justified.125
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas126
(overturning a Texas law that made homosexual sodomy illegal),
there is some indication that federal courts could impose a heightened
level of scrutiny to such cases. That heightened level of scrutiny is
appropriate; however, it still remains controversial and has yet to be
fully embraced by any U.S. federal court.127 In the meantime, there
are still prohibitions and restrictions in the United States, as just
described, that simply forbid or significantly impede the ability of
gay people to marry and have children.
II. LOCHNERIAN LIBERTY OF CONTRACT AS A BASIS FOR PROTECTING
LIBERTY GENERALLY
This article has just described the variety of ways that state
legislation and constitutional provisions restrict the liberty of gay
people to enter into arrangements to create families. In that
discussion, it became apparent that many arguments have been used
in attempts to protect the liberty interest of gay people in having
families.128
125. This was the case in Lofton, and it continues to be the position of the executive branch of the
federal government, as reflected in the 2009 Department of Justice memorandum submitted in the case
challenging DOMA. State courts have largely followed suit, though with some notable exceptions where
a heightened level of scrutiny was found not to be met by courts in California, Connecticut, and Iowa.
126. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127. For an article making a strong case for such heightened scrutiny, see Evangelos Kostoulas,
Comment, Ask, Tell, and Be Merry: The Constitutionality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Following
Lawrence v. Texas and United States v. Marcum, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 565, 585–88 (2007) (stating
homosexuals as a group have both traits necessary for an application of heightened scrutiny as suggested
by the Supreme Court). See also Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying
heightened scrutiny to a claim that the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy violated plaintiff’s right to
substantive due process).
128. Those arguments typically hinge on affording gay people protection from discriminatory
restrictions under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution or similar provisions of state constitutions. Heightened protection under those clauses
has typically been reserved for categories of discrimination that relate to race or gender but not sexual
orientation. As we have seen though, some state courts have applied heightened scrutiny to
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Lawrence v. Texas may well represent a heightened level of
scrutiny on the federal level for sexual orientation. See supra note 127. Arguments based on equal
protection and due process have been successful in some states (e.g., the marriage cases in California,
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Despite the intellectual merit of those arguments, the vast majority
of the states still prevent gay people from marrying,129 and many
states restrict gay people from entering into contracts to adopt130 or
entering into surrogacy arrangements.131 These restrictions are often
the result of historically strong religious and moral sentiments that
are skeptical of accepting gay people and granting them the same
rights accorded to heterosexual people. Those sentiments are often set
forth directly in the opinions on point.132 There are fears of the
normative consequences of effectively sanctioning gay nature and
behavior. Nowhere has this been clearer than in statements from
legislators regarding the adoption ban in Florida specifically stating
that the legislation was meant to tell gay people to get back in the
closet.133 Some claim that allowing gay marriage threatens
heterosexual marriage.134 There are claims that traditional
relationships must be given primacy and held up as the only truly
acceptable norm.135 Neither the high divorce rate for traditional
marriage nor the number of high profile heterosexual politicians and
celebrities having extra-marital affairs seem to weaken the force of
these arguments.136 The arguments are filled with religious and moral
zeal and come in direct conflict with the constitutional arguments
based on well accepted understandings of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, the traditional framework for analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment has grown to involve a threshold step of
Connecticut, Iowa, and Massachusetts) but have been more often unsuccessful (e.g., the adoption and
surrogacy cases coming out of Florida).
129. See supra Part I.A.
130. See supra Part I.B.1.
131. See supra Part I.B.2.
132. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 819 n.17 (11th
Cir. 2004).
133. See supra text accompanying note 71.
134. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, supra note 16, at 1376–78.
135. Id. at 1377–78; see also Conant, supra note 63.
136. “If the country needs any Defense of Marriage Act at this point, it would be to defend
heterosexual marriage from the right-wing ‘family values’ trinity of Sanford, Ensign, and Vitter
[referring to Congressmen Sanford, Ensign, and Vitter, each of whom had recently committed adultery,
with Vitter being identified as a regular client of a prostitution service in Washington D.C.].” Frank
Rich, 40 Years Later, Still Second-Class Americans, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2009, at WK8.
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categorizing the type of interest or the category of people involved
and then applying a level of scrutiny to legislation based on that
interest or that category. This categorization process has resulted in
the rights of certain interests and groups getting greater protection
than the rights of other interests or groups. The existing levels of
scrutiny have been criticized as creating double (or perhaps even
triple) standards.
Under the current paradigm, for example, discrimination against
gay people typically receives the lowest of the three levels of
scrutiny, rational basis.137 By contrast, discrimination against women
receives the intermediate level of scrutiny, while discrimination
against people based on race receives the highest level of strict
scrutiny. Further, scholars have posited that the outcome of
challenges is typically determined by what level of scrutiny is
applied. The lowest level typically means regulations and
discrimination will be upheld. The highest level, strict scrutiny,
typically means that the regulation and discrimination will be struck
down. The intermediate level, however, is not as clearly predictive.
Nowhere in the Constitution was such a system devised or
contemplated.
As was described in the Introduction, the purpose of this article is
to reframe the discussion of how civil liberties should be protected
and to provide another lens through which courts can evaluate
legislative restrictions. This new framework is somewhat separate
from the emotional arguments regarding the advancement of gay
rights on the one hand and the religious and moral arguments used to
protect the status quo on the other hand. The basis for this new
framework is economic and even-handed. It does not create the
double standards or different levels of scrutiny for legislation that
depend on the issues or groups affected. The framework focuses on
and defends the liberty of contract of all people. The liberty interest is
implicated across the full spectrum of life’s many aspects, not
specifically or only sexual orientation, though that is the focus for
application here.
137. See supra note 39.
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The central argument upon which this framework is based is that a
return to the critical scrutiny of all legislative encroachments on
liberty of contract that was prevalent during the Lochner era is
warranted, albeit with certain critical modifications. Such an
analytical framework is a neutral, even-handed, and appropriate tool
through which legislative restrictions can be evaluated. Neutral is
used here not as some have used it, meaning protection of the status
quo,138 but neutral in the sense that it applies equally to all groups and
issues.
A. The Lochner Decision and Framework
Beginning with the case itself, Lochner v. New York139 was decided
in 1905 and confronted the constitutionality of legislation limiting the
number of hours a person could work in a bakery.140 As is well
known by students and scholars of Constitutional Law, the Lochner
Court struck down this piece of legislation as an unconstitutional
limitation on the liberty of individuals to enter into contracts of their
choosing. Justice Rufus Peckham, writing for the majority of the
Lochner Court, reiterated a principle that was already found in
federal and state court cases,141 that “the general right to make a
138. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 885 (1987) (arguing that
Lochner can be interpreted as the judiciary attempting to take a neutral position with respect to the
existing common law in the sense that it did not want to change the status quo, nor did it think it was
appropriate for it to do so).
139. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
140. The limits of the statute were not particularly extreme. The statute mandated that no one work in
a bakery for more than sixty hours a week or ten hours a day. Id. at 46 n.†.
141. Id. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). State court cases have defended the
liberty of contract. See Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 462 (Ill. 1895) (striking down a statute regulating
the number of hours a woman could work in any factory or workshop); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 112–15
(1885) (striking down a statute restricting where tobacco could be manufactured, describing such a
restriction as an infringement on the right of an individual to earn a living); People v. Marx 2 N.E. 29,
33, 34 (N.Y. 1885) (ruling unconstitutional an act that prohibited the manufacture of butter substitutes
and stating “[t]he term ‘liberty,’ as protected by the constitution, is not cramped into a mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, as by incarceration, but is deemed to embrace the
right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties”). Interestingly, the language that Justice
Peckham used in Allgeyer to advance liberty of contract as a constitutional interest was taken verbatim
from the Jacobs case (though it did not cite to Jacobs) when Allgeyer defined liberty as
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person,
as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in
the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
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contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.”142
The Lochner Court was not without balance in its defense of
liberty of contract. It went to great lengths to expound upon the
notion that a state can legitimately interfere with the liberty interest
of the individual if that interference is within the appropriate police
powers of the state:143 “The question necessarily arises: Is this a fair,
reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state,
or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with
the right of the individual to his personal liberty . . . ?”144 The Court
was careful to explain that it was not trying to substitute its judgment
for the legislative judgment of the state but was instead strictly
assessing the regulation to see if it was appropriately within the
power of the state to enact.145
Of course, deciding whether a piece of legislation is within the
police power of the state mandates defining the police power of the
state. Without going into much detail, the Lochner Court described
the traditional police powers of the state as those powers that “relate
to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.”146
The Court was wary, however, that any piece of legislation might
easily be said to relate to such areas, effectively making any state
legislation immune from challenge under the Constitution. That
approach, however, would have been out of line with the very notion
of judicial review enunciated by the infamous Chief Justice John
Marshall back in the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803.147
Thus, the Lochner Court declared that the standard of review had to
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood
or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.
Allgeyer 165 U.S. at 589. Marx also cited to this language from Jacobs. See Marx, 2 N.E. at 33.
142. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
143. Id. at 53–56.
144. Id. at 56.
145. Id. at 56–57.
146. Id. at 53.
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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be more critical and searching of legislative regulations than
deferential.148 According to the Lochner Court, courts need to
carefully evaluate any legislative act before allowing it to curtail
liberty and survive:149 “The act must have a more direct relation, as a
means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and
legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with
the general right of an individual to be free in his person . . . .”150
Thus, the Lochner Court established a framework for the evaluation
of whether legislative regulations are permissible under the
Constitution. Legislative regulations are only allowed to impinge on
personal liberty of contract if they have a direct relation, as a means
to an end, which is appropriate and legitimate.
In evaluating the legislation at issue in the case—the limitation on
the hours a person could work in a bakery—the Court considered the
possible justifications for the regulation.151 The Lochner Court
concluded that the only possible justification was to protect the health
of the workers involved.152 While not rejecting the notion that the
health of workers was a legitimate part of the police powers of the
state, the Court rejected that justification in this case, skeptical of any
particular hardship that a bakery imposes on individuals.153 Using a
slippery slope argument, the Court claimed that if such a regulation
were allowed, regulations setting maximum working hours for
employees in all fields of work could be set.154 The Court was not
prepared to accept such regulations. A person “in almost any kind of
business . . . would . . . come under the power of the legislature, on
this assumption.”155 The Court viewed the liberty interest of being
able to work longer hours “to support himself and his family” as a
liberty interest that the state could not arbitrarily limit.156
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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The Court did cite to a case where a regulation setting maximum
working hours was upheld as Constitutional.157 In that case, however,
the industries involved were mining and smelting.158 The Court
highlighted a distinction that in such ultra-hazardous occupations,
health and public welfare were concerns if employees were left to
work hours that were too long.159 By contrast, and almost comically,
the Court described bakeries differently, stating, “Clean and
wholesome bread does not depend upon whether the baker works but
ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week.”160
B. Other Cases Decided During the Lochner Era
The Lochner era is so named because there were a wide variety of
cases the Supreme Court heard in which it applied this liberty of
contract framework to determine whether a particular piece of state
regulatory legislation was constitutional. The Lochner era is always
said to have begun in 1897 with Allgeyer v. Louisiana,161 a case cited
to by the majority in Lochner. In Allgeyer, the state of Louisiana
attempted to criminalize making an insurance contract with an out-ofstate insurer that did not abide by Louisiana laws and regulations.162
Allgeyer had entered into just such a contract with a New York
insurer but had done so in the state of New York.163 The only contact
with Louisiana was a notification that Allgeyer had sent to its New
York insurer.164 Justice Peckham, the same Justice who later wrote
for the majority in Lochner, wrote the opinion for the Court in
Allgeyer and struck down the regulatory action as an unconstitutional
infringement on the liberty of the Louisiana citizen to enter into the
insurance contract outside of the state of Louisiana.165 Justice

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 395 (1898).
Id.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54–55.
Id. at 57.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 579, 581.
Id. at 589, 593.
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Peckham used reasoning similar to that which he later used in
Lochner:
The “liberty” mentioned in [the Fourteenth] amendment means,
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary, and essential to his carrying out . . . [those]
purposes . . . .166

The Supreme Court continued to follow the liberty of contract
principles laid out in Allgeyer and Lochner until West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish was decided in 1937.167 In fact, the scholar Benjamin
Wright wrote in 1942 that 184 cases decided during the Lochner era
found state legislative regulations unconstitutional as violations of the
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.168 Those
statutes involved everything from maximum working hours (as in
Lochner itself), minimum wage requirements,169 and prohibitions on
organizing unions,170 to laws requiring children to be raised in
English-only schools.171
In 1937, the Supreme Court decided West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish.172 In West Coast Hotel, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a minimum wage law for women and minors. In
its deferential finding, the Court reasoned that protecting women and
minors from predatory commercial practices was surely within the
166. Id. at 589.
167. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
168. Benjamin F. Wright, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1942).
169. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539 (1923).
170. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 4–7 (1915).
171. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923).
172. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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police powers of the state and in the interest of the welfare of society
as a whole.173
West Coast Hotel overruled another Supreme Court opinion from
just fifteen years earlier, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, which
followed Lochner and found a statute prescribing a minimum wage
for women and children to be unconstitutional.174 The West Coast
Hotel Court found that the economic experience of the intervening
fifteen or so years warranted renewed consideration of the question
and a different finding, with more deference to the government
regulation.175 Perhaps ironically, the Adkins Court rejected the results
and reasoning of a case decided fifteen years earlier,176 Muller v.
Oregon.177 Like West Coast Hotel, Muller upheld as constitutional a
regulation protecting women in the workplace. In Muller, the
regulation mandated maximum working hours for women.178
The West Coast Hotel Court spoke disparagingly of the freedom of
contract trumpeted by the Lochner Court, asking almost facetiously,
“What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom
of contract. It speaks of liberty . . . .”179
Despite its critical tone toward any notion of liberty of contract,
West Coast Hotel still essentially followed Lochner in the sense that
it explained that the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment
surely existed but was subject to the police power of the state.180 It
was in the application of the Lochner framework that the West Coast
Hotel Court shifted gears away from Lochner’s critical assessment of
regulation and toward a more deferential approach that gave latitude
to the legislature to consider social and economic conditions when
enacting regulations.

173. Id. at 397–400.
174. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 548.
175. See West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 389–90.
176. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 552–53.
177. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
178. Id. The statute in question was an Oregon statute that prohibited women from working in
laundries for more than ten hours per day.
179. West Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 391.
180. Id.
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The West Coast Hotel Court explained that many states had been
enacting employment regulations to protect their work forces.181 The
Court then said, defiantly, “Legislative response to that conviction
cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious and that is all we have
to decide.”182 In other words, the West Coast Hotel Court said that as
long as the state legislature was not being arbitrary or capricious, it
was acting within its appropriate police power.183 This did indeed
represent a more deferential standard of review than the more
rigorous standard outlined in Lochner.
Shortly after the West Coast Hotel case was decided, the Supreme
Court put the final nail in the Lochner coffin with the Carolene
Products184 case, in which it confronted the constitutionality of the
national Filled Milk Act.185 The Carolene Products Court relied on
precedent from some twenty years earlier to find that regulating food
products is clearly within the police powers of the state in protecting
the health of its citizens.186
The Carolene Products opinion went on aggressively to state that
the presumption regarding legislation should be that “it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the
legislators.”187 Attached to that sentence was the now-famous
footnote 4. In footnote 4, the Court continued to describe the
“presumption of constitutionality” that should be accorded
legislation.188 The Court went on to suggest a heightened degree of
scrutiny for legislation that “appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.”189 In this way, the Supreme Court
181. Id. at 393.
182. Id. at 399.
183. Id.
184. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
185. The Filled Milk Act prohibited certain milk substitutes from entering interstate commerce. Id. at
144.
186. Id. at 148 (citing Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919) (upholding the constitutionality of an
Ohio statute that mandated that condensed milk be made from full cream milk)).
187. Id. at 152.
188. Id. at 152 n.4.
189. Id.
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formally enshrined a new judicial deference to general legislation,
with potentially heightened scrutiny for legislation that appears to
specifically violate the Constitution—legislation that might, for
example, impact freedom of speech or discriminate on the basis of
race.190
C. Criticisms of Lochner
The Lochner Court itself was divided on how to approach the
maximum working hours regulation under review in that case.191
Subsequent cases and scholars have joined with the dissenters in
decrying the logic and outcome of Lochner and by association the
other cases that were decided along similar principles.
Justice Holmes wrote a scathing dissent in Lochner that is often
quoted by critics of the majority’s opinion.192 Holmes claimed that
the majority’s decision was enforcing a laissez-faire political
philosophy upon society and that the Court was not acting within its
proper power in doing so.193 Holmes went further to suggest that
Justices in the majority were acting in accord with their preferences
as if they were legislators and not neutral interpreters of a
constitution.194 He described a variety of encroachments on the
liberty of contract that the Justices, were they acting as legislators
might think injudicious, but which nonetheless rightly were held to
be constitutional.195
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices White and Day, dissenting, stated
that legislation ought to be left undisturbed “unless it be, beyond
question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative power.”196
Justice Harlan went on to describe the working conditions of bakers
190. See O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–58 (1931) (showing
the use of a “presumption of constitutionality” by Justice Louis Brandeis to evaluate state regulations).
191. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
192. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 75 (citing Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606 (1903) (upholding a prohibition on selling stock on
margin) and Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898) (upholding a maximum eight hour work day for
miners)).
196. Id. at 68.
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as being particularly brutal and therefore well within the power of the
New York legislature to regulate:197 “Nearly all bakers are pale faced
and of more delicate health than the workers of other crafts, which is
chiefly due to their hard work and their irregular and unnatural mode
of living . . . .”198 In their dissents, Justices Holmes and Harlan, and
the other Justices who joined them showed the great deference to
state legislation that ultimately was echoed by the majority opinions
in West Coast Hotel and Carolene Products.
There have been many caustic scholarly commentaries on the
Lochner decision and its aftermath.199 In 2003 David Strauss wrote
that “Lochner v. New York would probably win the prize, if there
were one, for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred
years.”200 Another scholar recently referred to Lochner as a “bête
noire of modern constitutional scholarship.”201 Yet another scholar
described Lochner as, for many years, an established element of the
anti-canon of constitutional law.202 In other words, it is an opinion
that was so wrong that it needed to be studied for its place in the
historical development of the canon of cases that got the law and
analysis correct. All the more scholarship and debate concerning
Lochner was generated at the centennial of the decision in 2005.203
Just as Justices Holmes and Harlan argued, critics have decried the
Lochner court for substituting a laissez-faire political philosophy for
the policy preferences of the legislative bodies passing the
197. Id. at 70–71, 73.
198. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
199. For a lengthy listing of scholars who have decried the Lochner case as a glaring example of
judicial activism and an attempt by those Justices to empower businesses at the expense of the working
classes, see David N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 218–19 (2009). Included in that listing are
such heavy hitters as Roscoe Pound, Learned Hand, Charles Warren, and contemporary scholars such as
Geoffrey Stone, Jesse Choper, Lawrence Tribe, and Robert Bork.
200. David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong? 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003) (footnote
omitted).
201. Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian
Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 840 (2005).
202. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85
B.U. L. REV. 677, 682 (2005).
203. See, e.g., Symposium, Lochner Centennial Conference, 85 B.U.L. REV. 671 (2005); Symposium,
The 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 323
(2005).
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regulations being reviewed.204 Indeed, the political proclivities of the
Lochnerian Justices have been routinely described as demonically
Darwinist; the Justices were aware that their “survival of the fittest”
decisions favored the ruling class and sacrificed the working class but
were content with that result.205 This, the scholars argue, was
inappropriate, indeed inexcusable.206 It was in all of these
commentaries and the subsequent cases that cited back to Lochner as
an example of inappropriate judicial political activism that, as
Professor Howard Gillman expressed it, “Lochner had finally become
Lochnerized” and became a touchstone for inappropriate judicial
activism.207 Arguments of this sort were given more credence by
Justice Holmes’s claim in his dissent that the majority was relying on
a famous laissez-faire political treatise of the era, Sir Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics.208
There are also a variety of nuanced critiques of the Lochner
decision that a mere label of judicial activism does not capture. Some
argue that Lochner found a constitutional liberty of contract in the
Fourteenth Amendment where there simply was none.209 While
“liberty” is mentioned in that clause, “contract” never is. Charles
204. See Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821 (2005)
(referring to the Lochner Court as “one of the great activist Supreme Courts of U.S. history”).
205. For a survey of these arguments, see David Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised:
Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 n.6 (citing Derrick
Bell, Loren Beth, Archibald Cox, Robert McCloskey, and others in a fierce condemnation of the
Lochnerian justices and their support of the wealthier classes at the expense of the poor).
206. See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2005)
(discussing but challenging the traditional view of Lochner’s illegitimate policy-making).
207. Id. at 861 (citing WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 123–25 (1988)).
208. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 14th
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”).
209. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 44–46, 49 (1990) (footnote omitted) (“In his
1905 Lochner opinion, Justice Peckham, defending liberty from what he conceived to be ‘a mere
meddlesome interference,’ asked rhetorically, ‘[A]re we all . . . at the mercy of legislative majorities?’
The correct answer, where the Constitution is silent, must be ‘yes.’”); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18–20 (1980) (arguing that substantive due process is
an oxymoron and that the demise of Lochner was appropriate); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 574–78 (2nd ed. 1988) (discussing the internal inconsistencies of the application
of liberty of contract even during the Lochner era); Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 449 (1926) (“Whatever may be pedigree of the Allgeyer
case definition [of liberty], it is clear that the Court had departed from the original definition of ‘liberty’
which prevailed in 1789, and which had been the definition adopted by the State Courts prior to 1868.”).
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Warren was particularly skeptical of Lochner for having embraced a
constitutional right to liberty of contract. Warren argued that this
right was completely out of line with the framers’ notion that liberty
meant freedom from physical restraint.210 With a similar perspective,
in its opinion, the West Coast Hotel Court asked the public, “What is
this freedom?”211
Cass Sunstein argues that the Lochner decision should be viewed
as being more than just a case of judicial activism but also a case that
enshrines the judicial principle of neutrality.212 Sunstein views this
neutrality as a duty to defend the status quo as defined by the baseline
of the existing common law.213 According to Sunstein, Lochner
exemplifies this neutrality principle because the Court defended the
existing distribution of wealth and entitlement by overriding a
legislative action attempting to disrupt that balance. The status quo
being defended is based on the common law that existed at that time,
which allowed employers to freely contract with employees,
regardless of whether that may have favored the wealthier classes.214
Other critics do not focus on whether or not liberty of contract
exists in the Constitution but rather merely the extent to which it
should trump social legislation deemed necessary by the majority (as
reflected in a legislative enactment).215 Those critics find Lochner
objectionable in its overly-strong defense of that liberty interest and
in its sacrifice of the majoritarian regulations it defeated.216
Another, perhaps more palliative, critique was offered by the
Supreme Court in its opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.217
That opinion reflected the notion that the Lochner Court was not
wrong to find a liberty of contract interest in the Constitution nor was
it wrong to defend the liberty of contract in 1905.218 According to the
210. See Warren, supra note 209, at 449–50.
211. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
212. Sunstein, supra note 138, at 874.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 885.
215. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 200, at 376 (describing how judicial review was acceptable only to
correct significant governmental errors).
216. Id.; see also BORK, supra note 209.
217. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
218. Id. at 861.
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Casey Court, at that time the Lochner Court simply was unaware of
what an unregulated market might mean for social welfare.219 As the
Casey Court stated, the Lochner line of cases “rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a
relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human
welfare.”220 Awareness of those false assumptions came later as the
Depression took hold.221 It is only in light of that new awareness that
more modern courts could understand that regulations on social life
needed a more deferential constitutional approach.222
A large part of Lochnerian scholarship has been devoted to the
attempt to harmonize Lochner’s demise with the rise of other
unenumerated liberty interests that have since been found in the
Constitution.223 Criticizing Lochner’s support of a liberty interest
found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
presents a challenge to scholars who saw the growth of the right of
privacy and all of the specific case decisions based on that right as a
positive development. Included in those cases are those concerning
the right to use contraceptives,224 abortion,225 and even gay rights.226
In the 1970s, John Hart Ely coined the phrase “Lochnering” in
relation to the Roe v. Wade227 abortion case to indicate that the Roe
Court had, like the Lochner Court, based its opinion on rights that
were simply not present in the Constitution.228 Indeed, Robert Bork
has argued that if one wishes to support unenumerated rights to
privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, then one should go “all the
way” and support Lochner too.229 Bork was not advocating for that
outcome. Quite the contrary, he was attempting to show why cases
219. Id. at 861–62.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See also Balkin, supra note 203.
223. Bernstein, supra note 205, at 12–13.
224. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
225. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
226. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
227. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
228. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 944
(1973).
229. BORK, supra note 209, at 224–29.
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overturning restrictive legislation concerning contraception and
abortion were, like Lochner, inappropriate exercises of judicial
authority.230
D. A Historical Perspective
The demise of Lochner should also be put into its historical
context. As much as the philosophy of Lochner itself grew out of the
ideological underpinnings of the birth of a new nation and the
reconstruction era, its demise was precipitated by the new economic
conditions thrust upon a growing nation during the Great Depression.
Lochner’s basic premise that people should have the liberty to
structure their own lives free of government interference echoes the
trumpets of freedom that cried for independence from the
monarchical social structure of Europe. The Declaration of
Independence was clear in its guarantees of “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.”231 Early Supreme Court jurisprudence
emphasized that the federal courts were designed and empowered by
the structure of the new nation to review and keep a check on the
legislative branch of both the federal and state governments.232 Cases
like Lochner, its predecessor, Allgeyer, and cases decided in the same
era, like Adkins, all discussed above, reflect this suspicion of
government intrusions into the liberty of individuals to structure their
own arrangements and lives.
As the United States developed, so too did the strength of the
liberty of contract philosophy. By 1866, that philosophy was
expressly echoed in the Civil Rights Act passed that year, which gave
all “citizens, of every race and color, . . . [the] right . . . to make and
enforce contracts.” 233 Liberty of contract in that era was a metaphor

230. Id.
231. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
232. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
233. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). For a comprehensive examination of freedom of
contract as it evolved in antebellum years of the 1800s, see James W. Fox Jr., The Law of Many Faces:
Antebellum Contract Law Background of Reconstruction-Era Freedom of Contract, 49 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 61 (2007).
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for liberty itself.234 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,
complete with its guaranty of “liberty,” was drafted in this context.
The pressures of the Great Depression, however, saw a call for
more government intervention. There was growing distrust of the
managerial classes and suspicion that the working classes were being
abused and did not have the leverage in contract negotiations to
represent their own interests adequately. This view was clearly
manifested in the West Coast Hotel opinion, in which the Court went
to great lengths to discuss the possibility for abuse of women in the
workforce and the necessity of government intervention and
protection:235 “The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an
unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are thus
relatively defenceless [sic] against the denial of a living wage . . .
casts a direct burden . . . upon the community.”236
The progressives of the Depression Era rejected the individualism
espoused by the Lochnerian cases and their promotion of individual
liberties. Such scholars, politicians, and judges believed that more
social regulation was appropriate and advocated accordingly. Roscoe
Pound, Learned Hand, and Charles Warren all criticized Lochnerian
liberty of contract as going too far in sacrificing public welfare for
individual interests.237 Amazingly, Learned Hand actually advocated
amending the Constitution to delete the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as being too powerful in their
ability to defeat social legislation.238
President Franklin Roosevelt, upset with the Supreme Court’s
decisions rejecting regulatory legislation, threatened to change the

234. Id. at 61.
235. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
236. Id. at 399.
237. See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 456–57 (1909) (arguing that the
theorists advocating for liberty of contract were giving no consideration to actual industrial working
conditions for much of the public and that individualist conceptions of the private right of contract were
exaggerated at the expense of the public); Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day,
21 HARV. L. REV. 495 (1908); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
697, 699–700 (1931); Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV.
L. REV. 431 (1926).
238. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 249 (1994).
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make-up of the Court to include twice as many Justices.239 Of course
Roosevelt would have chosen the new Justices to achieve the results
from the Court that he wanted. Suddenly, change was in the air, and
Lochnerian liberty had become a jurisprudential moment of the past,
replaced by the judicial deference embodied by the rational basis test.
III. THE FLAWS OF LOCHNER AND THE SOLUTION: A SHIFTING
PRESUMPTION
As Part II just described, by the late 1930s the Lochner framework
had been discredited, and it continues to be largely out of favor.240
Many modern scholars continue to echo the writings and sentiments
of the scholars and judges who criticized Lochner in the early part of
the twentieth century.241
Nonetheless, the logic and philosophy underlying the Lochner era
cases still have great merit. The rulings in those cases rested on the
notion that there should be a presumption of liberty of contract for
individuals—allowing individuals to structure their own lives as they
see fit—and that the government should have some compelling
reason to interfere with that liberty interest. As Part I indicated, there
are still many ways in which government regulations restrict
individual liberty of contract, the focus there being on the liberty of
gay people to be married and have children. A return to a modified
version of that Lochnerian framework would help safeguard the
public against legislation that restricts individual liberty of contract
and consequentially individual liberty itself.
This Part will survey some of the neo-Lochnerian scholars who are
defenders, in some way, of the Lochner decision and framework. It
will then attempt to crystallize a modified Lochnerian framework that
can be used by modern courts as a safeguard against encroachments

239. It is impossible to resist citing the old adage that grew out of this historical moment, the famous
“switch in time that saved nine.”
240. See generally Mayer, supra note 199 (discussing the orthodox view of Lochner and its
reasoning).
241. Id. at 218–19.
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on civil liberties. Finally, it will apply that framework to the
restrictions on gay rights to family outlined in Part I.
A. Recent Scholarship and Case Law Supporting Lochner
Despite the strong criticism of Lochner over the past 100 years,
there are a growing number of voices that are recognizing that the
reaction to Lochner was overblown. Some of these voices suggest a
Machiavellian attempt by Progressive Era scholars, judges, and
politicians to demonize Lochner and its focus on individual liberty in
order to advance a different agenda, one centered on the promotion of
social legislation.242
One of the most recent and comprehensive articles rehabilitating
Lochner is David Mayer’s 2009 article, which criticizes what he
refers to as the commonly held “myths” about Lochner.243 Mayer
claims that “the orthodox view is wrong in virtually all its
assumptions.”244 Mayer employs a historical approach to explain that
the Lochner majority was not particularly laissez-faire in its
prevailing ideology but focused on balancing what it perceived were
historic and well-grounded liberty guarantees against undue intrusion
by government regulation.245 Mayer points out that if the Lochnerian
courts were truly laissez-faire in their approach then only those laws
that prohibit acts which actually harm others or abridge the legitimate
rights of others rights would have ever passed constitutional
muster.246 Quite the contrary, one of the major critiques of the
Lochner era was that so many cases seemed out of line with each
other.247 As much as there were many cases ruling that legislation
was unconstitutional as impinging on individuals’ liberty of contract,
242. Id. at 219–20 (stating that the progressive critics of Lochner were not at all objective or neutral in
their analysis). “[R]elying on the views of such partisans . . . [is like] relying on the views of the
National Right to Life organization to interpret Roe v. Wade.” Id. at 220.
243. Id. at 224.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 258–63.
246. Mayer, supra note 199, at 252–58. Laws that prohibit acts that actually harm others or that
abridge others’ legitimate rights would pass constitutional muster, as consistent with the limited scope of
the police power as envisioned by laissez-faire theorists (like Tiedeman).
247. Strauss, supra note 200, at 376.
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there were others upholding legislative restrictions.248 Mayer is one
scholar who criticizes the critics, claiming that the Progressive Era
scholars who defamed Lochner had their own activist agenda
advocating for a broader governmental role in structuring society.249
In a 2003 essay entitled, “Why Was Lochner Wrong,” David
Strauss both criticizes and defends the Lochner Court.250 Strauss
states that the Lochner Court acted defensibly in finding a liberty of
contract within the Fourteenth Amendment.251 Strauss points out that
even after Lochner was “interred” for finding rights not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court continued to do
so.252 Thus, the problem with the Lochner decision was not that it
found such a right but that it went too far in defending that right
against legislation.253
In 2003, David Bernstein wrote that Lochner should be reevaluated as “the progenitor of modern substantive due process cases
such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v.
Texas.”254 This argument reflects the dilemma that some scholars
have had with Lochner: how to criticize Lochner as inappropriately
expounding upon unenumerated rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, while still supporting those later substantive due
process cases. Bernstein does not so much solve this dilemma as
point out that it exists, despite the claims of other scholars that
Lochner should be cordoned off as a case concerned not with
fundamental liberties, but with an opposition to class legislation.255
Bernstein states that one of the latest cases to rely on the liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, Lawrence v.
Texas,256 is the clearest example of a modern court echoing (perhaps
248. See Mayer, supra note 199, at 224.
249. Id.
250. Strauss, supra note 200, at 375.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Bernstein, supra note 205, at 12–13.
255. Id. at 59–60 (citing Howard A. Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of
State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES. Q. 623 (1994)); Mayer,
supra note 199, at 218–19.
256. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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even relying on without citation) the analysis set forth in Lochner.257
Where the earlier fundamental rights cases, like Griswold v.
Connecticut258 and Roe v. Wade,259 spoke specifically of a right to
privacy found in the penumbra of rights that are contained in the Bill
of Rights and incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment,
Lawrence paid no deference to that framework.260 It was simple and
clear in its approach, like the courts of the Lochner era. It identified a
liberty interest being curtailed by legislation—the right to intimate
contact with an adult person of one’s choosing—and asked the state
to justify that legislation. Finding no satisfactory justification, the
Lawrence Court ruled that the restriction on liberty in that case
simply violated the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.261
Randy Barnett also discusses the liberty of contract jurisprudence
of Lochner and its transition into modern Supreme Court opinions.262
Barnett argues that the liberty interest described in Lochner was
actually rehabilitated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where the
Court spoke of a liberty interest and not only of the right to privacy
found in the penumbra of rights contained in the Bill of Rights.263
Barnett goes further in his analysis of the Lawrence case than did
Bernstein. Barnett views the Lawrence Court as not only defending a
general liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also reinvigorating the presumption of liberty that the Lochner courts
employed:264 “[W]ith liberty as the baseline, the majority places the
onus on the government to justify its statutory restriction.”265 The
Lawrence Court found no justification for its prohibition on sexual
intimacy between same-sex partners beyond moral approbation,

257. Bernstein, supra note 205, at 60.
258. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
259. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
260. Bernstein, supra note 205, at 60.
261. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
262. Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 21, 22–24 (2003).
263. Id. at 33.
264. Id. at 35.
265. Id.
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which was not sufficient to warrant upholding the statute.266 The
Lawrence Court cited back to the dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, the
1986 case that upheld a Georgia statute making sodomy illegal for
any person, stating affirmatively that morality “is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law.”267 The Lawrence Court also quoted from
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992 case addressing when
restrictions on the right to an abortion are constitutional, reaffirming
that “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code.”268 Barnett goes on to explain that morality alone
should never be a sufficient justification for a statute lest it forever be
invoked to immunize legislation from constitutional review.269
Barnett calls for a “robust ‘presumption of liberty’” to protect
individual rights across the political spectrum.270
B. A Revised Framework with a Shifting Presumption
As Justice Peckham, who wrote the majority opinion in Lochner,
might have said, basic notions of liberty are contingent upon liberty
of contract, without which liberty itself is illusory. The ability to
enter freely into contracts allows people to achieve their personal
desired balance of all that life has to offer. Starting with this premise
and building off of the Lochner opinion and the subsequent
scholarship of the neo-Lochnerians such as Mayer, Bernstein, and
Barnett described above, this article advocates a return to the robust
Lochnerian presumption of liberty. All legislative restrictions on such
liberty interest should be evaluated critically.
However, this call for a return to Lochnerian thought and analysis
is not and should not be thought of as any sort of absolutist bar to
social legislation that restricts freedom of contract. In addition, it is
not and should not be considered a call for a laissez-faire approach to
266. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582–85. For a thorough and insightful discussion of Lawrence’s
prohibition on the use of morality as the sole justification for government regulation, see Michael P.
Allen, The Underappreciated First Amendment Importance of Lawrence v. Texas, 65 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1045, 1050–59 (2008).
267. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)).
268. Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
269. See Barnett, supra note 262, at 38.
270. Id. at 41.
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government. As discussed above, these have been the primary
critiques of the Lochner case and its progeny.271 Indeed, Justice
Holmes, in his famous dissent in Lochner, criticized the majority for
just that reason.272 He claimed that the majority was adopting a
laissez-faire social and political theory and foisting that model onto
the states in a particularly noxious brand of judicial activism that
overturned much social legislation of the day.273 As scholars are
beginning to point out, however, that may have been a convenient
argument with which to rebut the Lochner opinion and its progeny.274
It may also have been somewhat disingenuous and misleading since
Lochner itself was careful to explain that appropriate exercises of the
police power of the state would be upheld.275
This article agrees with the neo-Lochnerians that the Lochnerian
model did, and would have continued to, allow for much legislation
that would encroach on the liberty of contract.276 In fact, it would
undoubtedly allow for regulations that ban certain contracts all
together based on their impact on the public welfare (possibilities
include, for example, gambling, prostitution, or polygamy though this
article is not taking a position on any of those issues). The legislation
simply must pass the critical analysis test. According to the Lochner
Court, restrictions are only allowed to impinge on personal liberty of
contract if they have a direct relation, as a means to an end, which is
appropriate and legitimate.277 To state it differently, restrictions
should be narrowly tailored to achieve an appropriate and legitimate
goal. To allow too much deference to legislation is to trample on the
rights of individuals to order their own affairs.278
As we have seen in Lawrence and elsewhere, a blanket statement
that the restriction is designed to protect the moral character of the
populace is insufficient. There must be more. Thus, for the examples
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra Part II.C.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
See Mayer, supra note 199.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
Mayer, supra note 199.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
See id. at 56.
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previously set forth (gambling, prostitution, or polygamy), the state
would need to defend the restrictions on a more compelling basis
than simply immorality. They must, in some way, be detrimental
enough to the health, for example, or financial well-being of the
populace to warrant regulatory intrusion on the liberty interest.
In addition, the proposal set forth here advocates for a
modification, perhaps simply an explicit nuance, to the Lochnerian
model that is more easily understood and incorporated in light of the
development of contract law over the past 100 years. That nuance to
the basic Lochnerian presumption in favor of liberty of contract is
that the presumption should shift and run to the benefit of the
regulation where the regulation can be seen as an attempt to address
structural or procedural flaws in the very nature of the contracts at
stake. Thus, where a regulation addresses the fairness of the
contracting process, the presumption in favor of freedom of contract
and against the restrictions should shift, and the judiciary should be
deferential to the regulation itself.
The very legislation at stake in Lochner, maximum working hours
for employees, might well have been upheld under this modified
paradigm. The statute was designed, arguably, to address a drastic
imbalance in the bargaining power that existed in 1905 between the
owners of bakeries and their employees. The structural problem with
the contracting process itself in that context makes the liberty of
contract at stake in that case illusory. There is no liberty of contract
for employees who are in a “take it or leave it” situation. Therefore,
there is no liberty of contract interest to protect. The employees might
be said to be under economic duress279 and forced to accept whatever
terms and conditions of employment are handed to them. Where the
liberty interest is illusory due to some defect in conditions necessary
to make the consent involved in the contract meaningful, the
presumption in favor of that liberty interest should shift in favor of
the regulation.

279. Duress is a concept that is much more familiar to contract law scholars in 2009 than it ever could
have been in 1905.
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The Lochner case itself failed to describe any sort of shifting
presumption or to recognize that in certain circumstances the
theoretical liberty of contract at stake simply does not exist.280 It is
this oversight, intentional or otherwise, that was the Lochner
decision’s biggest flaw. Perhaps it was just this oversight that caused
scholars like Roscoe Pound, when responding to the Lochner era
jurisprudence, to advocate for more legal realism.281
The Lochner Court overturned a legislative enactment that was
designed to help make the bargain involved in the contracts being
regulated closer to what would be bargained for if the bargain were
indeed a free one. This notion may well resonate with law and
economic scholars since the regulations that would be given
deference are those that attempt to recreate bargains that parties
would enter into if the bargaining process was truly fair, with consent
being meaningfully given by both parties. Where parties are able to
negotiate freely for their own wealth maximizing position, the law
should not interfere with the parties’ liberty to do so.
The basis of a contract is always consent, and the true consent of
the parties involved was at issue in Lochner and many cases
confronting similar social legislation. The legislature believed that
the workers (the bakers in the Lochner case) had little ability to
actually freely bargain or truly consent to the working conditions that
were thrust upon them.282 The regulation in Lochner, which created
maximum permitted working hours for the bakers, could be seen as
an attempt to create contracts that likely would have resulted if the
parties to those contracts were able to bargain freely and to give
meaningful consent to the terms of their arrangement.
Another problem with the historical use of the Lochnerian
analytical framework and one of the reasons why the framework is
often criticized is that the doctrine was not applied consistently or, in
some cases, accurately.283 Thus, far from being uniform in their
adherence to Lochnerian principles, many cases decided during the
280.
281.
282.
283.

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
Roscoe Pound, The Call for A Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See Strauss, supra note 200, at 375–76.
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Lochner era were incongruous.284 Certain restrictions on labor
contracts were allowed to remain, and others were not with no clearly
principled justification.285 The Court should have articulated the
standard more clearly, so it could have been applied more easily and
consistently. Still, intelligent and well-intentioned judges may
disagree about the outcomes in certain cases where there are close
calls. Notwithstanding that inevitable result, it is possible to define
the nuanced Lochnerian framework for analysis clearly and urge
uniform application of that framework.
Under the nuanced version of the Lochnerian analysis proposed
here, the basic presumption is in favor of liberty of contract and
against regulations that infringe on that liberty. Any regulation
infringing on that liberty interest would be subject to critical scrutiny.
In accord with Lochner, regulations are only allowed to impinge on
personal liberty of contract if they have a direct relation as a means to
an end, which is appropriate and legitimate.286 However, that
“robust” presumption in favor of liberty of contract shifts and favors
upholding the regulation where the regulation is designed to address
structural or procedural flaws in the contracts involved.
In attempting to identify regulations that address structural or
procedural flaws in the contracting process itself, courts should be
conscious of doctrinal developments in the law of contract that exist
to safeguard against procedural and substantive unfairness. Included
in these doctrines are equitable concepts of fraud, misrepresentation,
lack of capacity, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability.
These doctrines exist in contract law in effect as ex post regulation.
They exist to buttress the sanctity and stability of contract and the
fairness of the resulting bargains that parties enter. Being mindful of
such doctrines and the susceptibility of contracting to flaws, courts
should be deferential to restrictions that attempt to correct for such
284. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 at 395.
285. In contrast to Lochner, for example, is Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), a case that upheld
a statute mandating certain maximum working hours for women. The Court in Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U.S. 426 (1917), upheld a statute mandating maximum working hour for both men and women.
286. The language of existing constitutional levels of scrutiny (rational basis, intermediate, or strict) is
specifically avoided here because this new paradigm is wholly different and avoids the three-levels of
scrutiny that have been established for Fourteenth Amendment claims.
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flaws. Such restrictions should be seen as nothing more than ex ante
equitable measures designed to work in tandem with the
jurisprudential contract doctrines that are applied in litigation ex post
to buttress the sanctity and stability of contracting and the fairness of
the contractual results. The nuanced Lochnerian framework proposed
here is set forth in the following flow chart.
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Modified Lochnerian Framework
for
Liberty of Contract Analysis

Is liberty of contract implicated?

Yes

No

Presumption in
favor of liberty
interest

Uphold
restriction

BUT -- does
restriction
redress
contracting
flaw?

Yes

Shift presumption in favor
of restriction

No

Presumption in favor of liberty
interest remains

Presumption overcome if the
regulation has a direct relation to a
appropriate governmental goal
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C. Applying the New Paradigm to Gay Rights to Family
Applying the intellectual tradition of Lochner and the nuanced
Lochnerian framework proposed here to the panoply of gay rights to
family, some regulations that are crucial to protect the contracting
process would be given deference and likely found to be
constitutional, but blanket prohibitions on gay people entering into
certain types of contracts would likely not be upheld. For example,
regulations affecting the age or capacity of the parties involved in any
family related contract would likely be upheld. Such regulations
protect the integrity of the contracting process by ensuring adequate
capacity of the parties involved. However, regulations that
completely disenfranchise any group of people from participating in
contracts that help create families287 would receive critical scrutiny
and most likely be deemed unconstitutional. This is a new approach
and demands a more searching analysis of the restrictions at stake
than the deferential rational basis being used now for regulations that
burden an individual’s liberty to contract.
1. Marriage
The statutes and state constitutional provisions that ban gay
marriage would likely be struck down under the new framework.
Applying the new paradigm requires three logical steps: (1) identify
whether liberty of contract is at stake; (2) determine whether the
restriction impermissibly impinges on that liberty interest; in doing
this there should be a beginning presumption that the restriction is not
constitutional, and this presumption can be overcome if the restriction
has a direct relation to an appropriate governmental goal; (3) assess
whether the restriction is designed to redress some structural or
procedural flaw in the contract process under consideration; if so,
then the presumption of unconstitutionality should shift and the

287. It may be worth noting that contracts in and of themselves surely do not create families. It is this
author’s view, just for the sake of clarity, that people create families with or without contracts through
their personal bonds with other people, related or not. However, certain important legal rights pertaining
to family are accessible and recognizable only through contract.
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restriction should be presumed to be constitutional and subjected only
to a deferential rational basis type of review.
Ticking through these steps—first, is there a liberty of contract
interest in the ability to freely enter into a marriage contract? The
answer is plainly yes. For many years the Supreme Court has
discussed the primacy of marriage as a fundamental liberty interest.
Moreover, one of the benefits of the Lochnerian analytical framework
is moving away from the challenges of characterizing certain liberties
as fundamental. Regardless of whether there is a fundamental liberty
interest in marriage as an institution, there is clearly a contract
involved in marriage. Two people agree with each other to be bound
together in marriage and all that the institution entails legally,
including property and inheritance rights. Thus, there is a liberty
interest in individuals being able to enter into such contracts without
undue interference from government.
Second, do the statutory and constitutional bans impermissibly
impinge on that liberty of contract? As was mentioned above, this test
is not designed to bar all restrictions on any liberty interest. This test
starts with the presumption in favor of the liberty interest and against
the constitutionality of the restriction. That presumption is overcome
if the restriction has a direct relation, as a means to an end, which is
appropriate and legitimate.
Here the outright ban on marriage does not regulate aspects of a
marriage contract between gay people that are appropriate and within
the traditional regulatory powers of the state. The ban completely
takes away the liberty of gay people to get married. Under no
circumstances is a marriage allowed in states where such activity is
banned. Recall that morality as a justification for government
regulatory action should not be enough. Is there another compelling
reason for a ban on gay marriage? Is the health or financial welfare of
the population at stake? Again, the answer is no. Some have argued
that allowing gay marriage hurts or diminishes the sanctity of
marriage generally. That argument seems to be nothing more than the
morality argument and should not be given any merit. Accordingly, it
would seem that such an outright ban on entering into contracts for
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marriage would not trump the presumption in favor of the liberty
interest and would not be allowed to stand.
The analysis is not through until the third question is asked—does
the restriction represent an attempt to redress some flaws in the
contracting process? If so, the presumption in favor of the liberty
interest and against the restrictions should shift. But here, the answer
is clearly no. While the social legislation at stake in Lochner could be
seen as an attempt to empower a group that had no contracting
leverage whatsoever, the ban on gay marriage does no such thing. On
balance, after applying this three-pronged Lochnerian framework, the
ban on marriage should fail.
2. Adoption
The analysis is similarly straightforward when it comes to the
restrictions on gay adoption. This section uses the Florida and Utah
laws as examples.288 Florida, similar to Mississippi, represents the
extreme position of an outright ban on gay people adopting, while
Utah, similar to Arkansas and Michigan, restricts gay couples from
adopting by stating a preference for married people and prohibiting
unmarried couples from adopting.
Turning to the three-pronged test, first, there is certainly a liberty
of contract interest in entering into contracts for adoption. Again,
cases throughout the history of the United States enshrine the liberty
to have and raise children. Once again, however, the Lochnerian
analysis need not even go that far. For that purpose, it is clear that
there are contracts involved in the adoption process. Prospective
parents agree with biological parents, an adoption agency, and/or the
state to become the legal parents of the child or children involved,
with all the rights and obligations that such parenthood entails. Those
prospective parents, therefore, have a liberty of contract interest in
entering into those contractual arrangements without undue
government interference.

288. See supra Part I.B.2.
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Of course that liberty is not absolute, and the second step asks
whether the restrictions in question are reasonable and therefore
permissible. The presumption is in favor of the liberty interest and
against the restrictions. That presumption can be overcome if the
state can show that its restrictions have a direct relation, as a means to
an end that is appropriate and legitimate. If the restrictions were
designed to protect the best interests of the child, such restrictions
would likely be upheld as appropriate and legitimate. With the
Florida blanket prohibition on gay people adopting regardless of the
best interests of the child, however, the restrictions go too far in
limiting the liberty interest at stake.
Once again, we still have to address the third prong of the test to
see whether the presumption in favor of the liberty interest should
shift. Can the gay adoption restriction be seen as a way to redress
some flaw in the contracting process that is involved with adoption?
There seems to be no plausible way to answer that question
affirmatively. Thus, the outright ban on adoption would seem to be
unconstitutional.
The Utah standard is more complicated. Recall that in Utah, the
statutory restrictions call for an adopted child to be placed with a
married couple if at all possible and not with single people unless
absolutely necessary. Moreover, the statute forbids couples who live
together but are unmarried from adopting. This framework involves
two restrictions that need to be assessed separately.
The first prong of the test is the same for both restrictions. There is
a liberty of contract interest involved with entering into contractual
arrangements to adopt. Thus, there is a presumption that restrictions
will be unconstitutional unless they can be shown to have a direct
relation to an appropriate government goal.
With respect to the strong preference that children be placed with
married couples instead of singles, this presents a potentially difficult
case. One can imagine arguments that children’s best interests are
served by placing them in a home with two parents, rather than just
one. There are likely to be more resources available for the children
and more guardians available to care for them. Further, the restriction
is not an outright ban on single people adopting but rather just a
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presumption. Thus, even with the restriction, a court could rule that
an adoption go forward with a single parent, assuming it was in the
best interests of the child. Thus, this restriction may be allowed to
pass the critical analysis phase and be upheld as constitutional,
despite the starting presumption that it is unconstitutional.
With respect to the ban prohibiting couples that are not married
from adopting, this restriction is tougher to justify and would likely
not overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. This restriction
appears to be nothing more than an outright ban on certain people
adopting, regardless of what is in the best interests of the child. Such
an outright ban does not appear to have direct relation to a legitimate
governmental goal. Indeed, this restriction appears to be motivated
solely by some sense of morality (that couples living together should
be heterosexual and married), which the Lawrence case has stated is
simply impermissible as a justification.289
Moving to the third prong of the test, with respect to both of these
restrictions—the preference for married couples over single people
and the ban on unmarried couples—there seems to be no possible
explanation that either regulation is attempting to redress structural or
procedural defects with the contract. Accordingly, the presumption in
favor of the liberty interest should remain. Still, the preference for
married couples may be able to overcome that presumption, while the
outright ban on unmarried couples would likely not.
3. Surrogacy
Surrogacy contracts are likely to get constitutional protection under
the new analytical framework. Again, applying the three-pronged
framework, the first question is whether there is a liberty of contract
interest. Here again, the answer is yes. In addition to the Supreme
Court for many years expounding upon the fundamentality of the
liberty interest in having and raising children, surrogacy is an
arrangement that is created through contract. There are contracts
between the intended parents and the surrogate, potentially an egg
289. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).
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donor, and perhaps a service that coordinates the surrogacy. Thus,
there is a liberty of contract interest and, in accordance with the new
framework being introduced here, a presumption against any
restrictions.
The primary restriction that prevents gay people from entering into
surrogacy contracts is the marriage requirement imposed by many
states, discussed in Part I.B.2. That restriction would be able to
overcome the presumption against it if it has a direct relation to an
appropriate governmental goal. Here, however, the marriage
requirement essentially forbids gay people categorically from
engaging in the regulated activity. Once again, if the ban had
appropriate justifications beyond morality, it might be allowed to
overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. However, it is
difficult to conceive of any compelling arguments. The most common
argument is likely based on a notion that relationships bound by
marriage are more enduring than those that are not, and thus, almost
by definition, having married parents is in the best interest of a
prospective child. However, there is no clear evidence of such a
claim. Indeed, one of the Florida courts that overturned the gay
adoption ban went to great lengths to refute such a contention.290
Thus, once again, the restriction should likely be found
impermissible.
Finally, the third prong of the test asks whether the restrictions are
meant to redress some flaw in the contracts involved with surrogacy.
There are some limits on surrogacy that can be understood this way.
For example, the Illinois statute that mandates that the surrogate
receive both psychological and legal counseling is surely a restriction
that is designed to make the bargaining process between the surrogate
and the intended parent(s) a fair one. In that case, the new framework
for analysis would be deferential to the restriction and likely allow it
to stand.

290. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5070056 at *15–17 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008) (setting forth
the testimony of trial experts that having same-sex parents is not in any way detrimental to a child’s
upbringing).
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On the other hand, the marriage requirement, which represents a
blanket prohibition on all single or unmarried people from entering
into a surrogacy contract, does not in any way seem to redress a
bargaining imbalance or any problems involved in the relevant
contracts. Accordingly, that particular restriction would not get the
benefit of the shifting presumption and would be evaluated critically.
It should be found to be overreaching and struck down.
CONCLUSION
As the quote set forth at the beginning of this article states,
legislative and constitutional restrictions on liberty of contract are
generally said to be in the public interest but are often passed for
other motives. In the case of the restrictions that absolutely prevent
gay people from marrying, adopting, or having children via a
surrogate, the rationale seems clear. Just as Senator Peterson said in
1977, it is a message to gay people to “get back in the closet.”291
Current arguments that attack the restrictions on gay rights to
family have had some success, but that success has been limited. The
states still largely forbid gay marriage, and many states limit the
ability of gay people to have children through adoption or surrogacy
arrangements.
This article has presented a new framework for analysis that might
be employed by advocates and courts alike. The framework moves
away from emotional pleas to give gay people the heightened
protection accorded to victims of gender or racial discrimination.
Those arguments have been met frequently with skepticism or even
contempt based on religious or moral convictions that gay behavior
should not be condoned as a normative matter. The new framework
offered here turns away from polarizing arguments defending or
condemning any particular kind of life style or religious position. The
framework is built off a platform of economic liberty—the liberty of
contract that was the predominant analytical framework of the
Lochner era.
291. Gay Bills Pass Both Chambers, supra note 71, at B2.
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This new framework calls for courts to begin with the working
presumption that the liberty interest should prevail over any attempts
to curtail it. That presumption can be overcome if the restriction is
directly related to an appropriate governmental purpose. However,
the presumption in favor of the liberty interest should shift in favor of
any regulations that attempt to ensure the integrity of the contract
involved. If the contract at stake is either structurally or procedurally
flawed, there should be no deference given to it.
In accord with this new framework, untold motives based on
religious or moral convictions will be insufficient to provide
constitutional cover for regulations and restrictions that infringe on
liberty of contract. In this way, it is this author’s hope that liberty
itself can be better protected.

Published by Reading Room, 2011

59

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

668

[Vol. 27:3

APPENDIX A
STATE MARRIAGE AND RELATIONSHIP LAWS
I.

States that have legalized gay marriage:292
California (2010)293
Connecticut (2008)
District of Columbia (2010)
Iowa (2009)
Massachusetts (2004)
New Hampshire (2010)
Vermont (2009)

II. States that have statutes against gay marriage:294
Delaware
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Maryland
Minnesota
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
III. States that have constitutional amendments against gay
marriage:295
Alabama (2006)
Alaska (1998)
Arizona (2008)
Arkansas (2004)
California (2008)
Colorado (2006)
292. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32.
293. California has been included here as a result of the recent decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
294. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, supra note 28.
295. Id.
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Florida (2008)
Georgia (2004)
Kansas (2005)
Idaho (2006)
Kentucky (2004)
Louisiana (2004)
Michigan (2004)
Mississippi (2004)
Missouri (2004)
Montana (2004)
Nebraska (2000)
Nevada (2002)
North Dakota (2004)
Ohio (2004)
Oklahoma (2004)
Oregon (2004)
South Carolina (2006)
South Dakota (2006)
Tennessee (2006)
Texas (2005)
Utah (2004)
Virginia (2006)
Wisconsin (2006)
IV. States that permit civil unions, according some marriage-like
rights:296
New Jersey
V.

States that permit domestic partnerships or civil unions,
according some marriage like rights:297
Nevada
Oregon
Washington

296. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality, supra note 32.
297. Id.
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APPENDIX B
STATE ADOPTION LAWS
All states proceed in the best interests of the child with the following
exceptions:

Michigan:

no one cohabiting outside of marriage may adopt
See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 710.24.

Mississippi: same gender couples may not adopt
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5).
Utah:
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presumption that children should be adopted by
married people and no one cohabiting outside of
marriage may adopt
See U.C.A. § 78B-6-117.
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APPENDIX C
STATE SURROGACY LAWS CATEGORIZED
I.

States with surrogacy statutes but marriage requirement:
Florida
Nevada
New Hampshire
Oklahoma
Texas
Utah
Virginia

II. States with surrogacy statutes where no marriage
requirement:
California
Connecticut
Illinois
Kentucky
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
Oregon
Washington
West Virginia
III. States where surrogacy is illegal:
Delaware
Washington D.C.
Indiana
Louisiana
Michigan
Nebraska
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New York
North Dakota
IV. States where the legal status of surrogacy is unclear:
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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